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Endogenous Structure of Polycentric Urban Area
Abstract
The purpose of paper is to investigate how the interplay of trade, commuting and communi-
cation costs shapes economy at both inter-regional and intra-urban level. Specifically, we study
how economic integration affects the internal structure of cities and and how decentralizing the
production and consumption of goods in secondary employment centers allows firms located in a
large city to maintain their predominance.
JEL Classification: F12, F22, R12, R14
Key-words: city structure, secondary business centers, commuting costs, trade costs, commu-
nication costs
Introduction
A weakness in urban economic theory is that it has relied too heavily on the monocentric city model.
A single job center runs counter to the evidence that has accumulated in the empirical literature on
employment subcenters. But, the main drawback of the monocentric model is that it fails to explain
that job location – even in a single center – is not exogenous but depends on other determinants of
urban form. A reasonably tractable polycentric model can be based on the assumption that production
and residential uses can occur everywhere in an initially featureless space but become interdependent
by the commuting decisions of workers and the communication linkages among firms. Producers value
access to other producers, to labor, and to facilities that help to run its business. The location of
production and, hence, of jobs is endogenous as is the location of residences and, hence, of labor. From
this perspective the monocentric city arises as the total clustering of jobs.
Moreover, cities are involved into the process of inter-regional trade. It is, therefore, fundamental
to understand (i) how the intensity of trade is influenced by their size and structure and, conversely,
(ii) how economic integration affects the internal structure of cities. This is what we undertake in this
study by modeling the interplay between trade costs, commuting costs and communication costs. Our
approach combines basic ingredients from urban economics and new economic geography.
Creation of subcenters within a city, i.e. the formation of a polycentric city, appears to be a natural
way to alleviate the burden of urban costs. It is, therefore, no surprise that Anas et al. (1998) observe
that “polycentricity is an increasingly prominent feature of the landscape.” Thus, the escalation of
urban costs in large cities seems to prompt a redeployment of activities in a polycentric pattern,
while smaller cities retain their monocentric shape. However, for this to happen, firms set up in the
secondary centers must maintain a very good access to the main urban center, which requires low
communication costs.
Comparison to other approaches
Trying to explain the emergence of cities with various sizes our framework, unlike Helpman (1998),
Tabuchi (1998) and others, allows cities to be polycentric. Moreover, in contrast to A. Sullivan (1986),
K. Wieand (1987), and (Helsley and Sullivan, 1991), in our treatment, there are no pre-specified
locations or numbers of subcenters, and our model is a fully closed general equilibrium spatial economy.
As mentioned above, emergence of additional job centers is based on the urge towards decreasing of
urban costs, rather than mysterious consumer’s “propensity to big malls”, as suggested (Anas and
Kim, 1996). Our approach, that takes into account various types of costs (trade, commuting, and
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Figure 1: Polycentric city
communication) is similar to J. Cavailhe`s et al. (2007) with one important exception. We drop very
convenient (yet non-realistic) assumption on “long narrow city”. Our analysis is extended to the
two-dimension because the geographical space in the real world is better approximated by a two-
dimensional space.
1 Model overview
1.1 Spatial structure
Consider an economy with R ≥ 1 regions, one sector and two primary goods, labor and land. Each
region can be urbanized by accommodating firms and workers within a city, and is formally described
by a two-dimensional space X = R2 (or by sufficiently large area around origin). Whenever a city
exists, it has a central business district (in short CBD) located at the origin 0 ∈ X. Residence zone
around CBD assumed to be a circle due to geographical homogeneity. One would expect us to explain
why this CBD exists as well as why firms leaving the CBD want to be together and form a secondary
business districts, in short SBDs.
Firms are free to locate in the CBD or to set up in the suburbs of the metro where they form a
SBDs. Both the CBD and SBDs are assumed to be dimensionless, while residence zones around SBDs
are also circles. In what follows, the superscript C is used to describe variables related to the CBD,
whereas S describes the variables associated with a SBDs. Without loss of generality, we focus on the
only one of SBDs, because all SBDs are supposed to be identical. Locations are expressed by variable
x ∈ X while distances are measured as Euclidean norm ||x|| for CBD-zone, whereas the SBD in city
r, if any, is established at xSr 6= 0, which is endogenous. Even though firms consume services supplied
in each SBD, the higher-order functions (specific local public goods and non-tradeable business-to-
business services such as marketing, banking, insurance) are still located in the CBDs.
Hence, for using such services, firms set up in a SBD must incur a communication cost, which is
given by
K(xSr ) = K + k · ||xSr || (1)
where K and k are two positive constants. Indeed, communicating requires the acquisition of specific
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facilities, thus explaining why communication costs have a fixed component. However, relationships
between the CBD and a SBD also involves face-to-face communication. Therefore, some workers must
go to the CBD, thus making communication costs dependent on the distance ||xSr || between the CBD
and the SBD. Both the CBD and the SBD are surrounded by residential areas occupied by workers.
Furthermore, as the distance between the CBD and SBD is small compared to the intercity distance,
we disregard the intra-urban transport cost of goods.
Finally, we consider the case where the CBD of urbanized region r is surrounded by mr ≥ 1 SBDs.
Under those various assumptions, the location, number and size of the SBDs as well as the size of
the CBD will be endogenously determined. In other words, apart from the assumed existence of the
CBD, the internal structure of each city is endogenous.
1.2 Workers
The economy is endowed with L mobile workers. The welfare of a worker depends on her consumption
of the following three goods. The first good is unproduced and homogeneous. It is assumed to be
costlessly tradeable and chosen as the nume´raire. The second good is produced as a continuum n of
varieties of a horizontally differentiated good under monopolistic competition and increasing returns,
using labor as the only input. Any variety of this good can be shipped from one city to the other at
a unit cost of τ > 0 units of the nume´raire. The third good is land; without loss of generality, we set
the opportunity cost of land to zero. Each worker living in city 1 ≤ r ≤ R consumes a residential plot
of fixed size chosen as the unit of area. The worker also chooses a quantity q(i) of variety i ∈ [0, n],
and a quantity q0 of the nume´raire. She is endowed with one unit of labor and q¯0r > 0 units of the
nume´raire. The source of this endowment will be discussed in proper time. At this moment initial q¯0r
are considered as exogenous parameters. Each worker commutes to her employment center – without
cross-commuting – and bears a unit commuting cost given by t > 0, so that for the worker located at
x the commuting cost is either t||x|| or t||x− xSr || according to the employment center.
The budget constraint of an individual residing at x ∈ X in city r and working in the corresponding
CBD can then be written as follows:
nˆ
0
p(i)q(i)di+ q0 +R
C
r (||x||) + t||x|| = wCr + q¯0r (2)
where RCr (x) is the land rent prevailing at location x (in fact, it depends on distance ||x|| from the
CBD only). The budget constraint of an individual working in the SBD, located at specific place xSr
is
nˆ
0
p(i)q(i)di+ q0 +R
S
r (||x− xSr ||) + t||x-xSr || = wSr + q¯0r. (3)
Preferences over the differentiated product and the nume´raire are identical across workers and repre-
sented by a utility function U(q0; q(i), i ∈ [0, n]).
The considerable part of our results does not depend on the utility specification. For more detailed
study of the wage and welfare aspects we use Ottaviano’s quasi-linear utility function
U(q0; q(i), i ∈ [0, n]) = α
nˆ
0
q(i)di− β
2
nˆ
0
[q(i)]2di− γ
2
 nˆ
0
q(i)di
2 + q0 (4)
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where α, β, γ > 0. Reason of this choice is that this function was used in comprehensive analysis of
linear city with two SBDs in Cavailhe`s et al. (2007). Comparing our results with ones from this paper
we reveal some features of two-dimensional model of city, which could not be obtained in framework
of linear city.
1.3 Firms
Technology in manufacturing is such that producing q(i) units of variety i requires a given number
ϕ of labor units.1 There are no scope economies so that, due to increasing returns to scale, there is
a one-to-one relationship between firms and varieties. Thus, the total number of firms is given by
n = L/ϕ. Labor market clearing implies that the number of firms located (or varieties produced) in
city r is such that nr = λrn, where λr stands for the share of workers residing in r.
Denote by ΠCr (respectively Π
S
r ) the profit of a firm set up in the CBD of city r (respectively the
SBD). Let θr be the share of firms located in the CBD and, therefore, by (1−θr)/m the share of firms
in each SBD. When the firm producing variety i is located in the CBD, its profit function is given by:
ΠCr (i) = Ir(i)− ϕ · wCr (5)
where
Ir(i) = prr(i) ·Qrr(i) +
∑
s 6=r
(prs(i)− τ) ·Qrs(i)
stands for the firm’s revenue earned from local sales Qrr(i) and from exports Qrs(i) from r to s. When
the firm sets up in the SBDs of the same city, its profit function becomes:
ΠSr (i) = Ir(i)−K(xSr )− ϕ · wSr (6)
the firm’s revenue is the same as in the CBD because shipping varieties within the city is costless so
that prices and outputs do not depend on firm’s location in the city.
1.4 Two-dimensional features
The short overview of the model allows to point out some differences two-dimensional model from
model of “long narrow city” that could be substantial for final outcomes. Urban costs (commuting
and communication) mainly depend on distances or geographic size of the city, which is proportional
to population or demographic size in linear city and less than proportional in two-dimensional model
(to be more specific, geographic size increases as square root of population). Moreover, an additional
economy on scale in urban costs comes from possibility to allocate more than two SBDs around
central zone. It means that linear model (possibly) overestimates dispersion forces (caused by urban
costs) in comparison to agglomeration forces (related to monopolistic competition). In other words,
two-dimensional model is “more favorable” to formation of larger city agglomeration.
1One may assume that producing one unit of variety i requires additionally c ≥ 0 units of nume´raire. This is not
substantive generalization, however, because this model is technically equivalent to one with c = 0 (see Ottaviano et al.,
2002)
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2 Urban Costs and Decentralization within a City
A city equilibrium is such that each individual maximizes her utility subject to her budget constraint,
each firm maximizes its profits, and markets clear. Individuals choose their workplace (CBD or SBDs)
and their residential location with respect to given wages and land rents. In each workplace (CBD or
SBDs), the equilibrium wages are determined by a bidding process in which firms compete for workers
by offering them higher wages until no firm can profitably enter the market. Given such equilibrium
wages and the location of workers, firms choose to locate either in the CBD or in the SBDs. At the
city equilibrium, no firm has an incentive to change place within the city, and no worker wants to
change her working place and/or her residence. In this section, we analyze such an equilibrium, taking
as fixed the number of workers lr = λrL. To ease the burden of notation, we drop the subscript r.
2.1 Land rents, wages and workplaces
Within each city, a worker chooses her location so as to maximize her utility U(q0, q(i); i ∈ [0, n])
under the corresponding budget constraint, (2) or (3). Let ΨC(x) and ΨS(x) be the bid rent at
x ∈ X of an individual working respectively in the CBD and the SBD. Land is allocated to the
highest bidder. Because there is only one type of labor, at the city equilibrium it must be that
R(x) = max
{
ΨC(x),ΨS(x), 0
}
. We assume that some non-profit collecting agency redistributes
uniformly all of collected rent among all population of city. Thus initial endowment q¯0 is in fact an
individual share of nume´raire good, financed by the equal share of total raised rent in specific city.
For given CBD’s share of firms θ, number of SBDs m and city’s population l we obtain the following
values of central zone radius rC and distance ||xS || from CBD to any SBD:
rC =
√
θl
pi
, ||xS || =
√
θl
pi
+
√
(1− θ)l
mpi
. (7)
The equilibrium land rents, equalizing the disposable income for all locations x ∈ X are given by
RC(x) = t ·
(√
θl
pi
− ||x||
)
, for ||x|| ≤
√
θl
pi
(8)
and
RS(x) = t ·max
{
0,
√
(1− θ)l
mpi
− ||xS − x||
}
, for ||x|| >
√
θl
pi
(9)
where xS ∈ X is SBD closest to x ∈ X. Initial endowment (i.e., redistributed total rent):
q¯0 =
1
l
ˆ
X
R(x)dx =
t
3
·
√
l
pi
[
θ3/2 +
(1− θ)3/2√
m
]
(10)
The wage difference between CBD and SBD:
wC − wS = t
(√
θl
pi
−
√
(1− θ)l
mpi
)
. (11)
Thus, the difference in the wages paid in the CBD and in the SBD compensates exactly the worker
for the difference in the corresponding commuting costs.
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2.2 Urban Costs
City equilibrium state implies that for each consumer in both centrum and suburbia should be equiv-
alent, i.e.
EC = wC + q¯0 −RC(x)− t||x|| ≡ ES = wS + q¯0 −RS(x)− t||x− xS ||.
Using this equivalence we focus on consumption of CBD workers. By the obvious reason EC should
be at least non-negative. Let’s define urban costs as a sum of rent and commuting costs minus initial
endowment q¯0.
2 Due to (8-10) these urban costs are as follows
CCu = R
C(x) + t||x|| − q¯0 = t
√
θl
pi
− t
3
·
√
l
pi
[
θ3/2 +
(1− θ)3/2√
m
]
,
CSu = R
S(x) + t||x− xS || − q¯0 = t
√
(1− θ)l
pi
− t
3
·
√
l
pi
[
θ3/2 +
(1− θ)3/2√
m
]
.
(12)
The city equilibrium implies that the following identity holds
wC − CCu = wS − CSu .
In these terms, the wage wedge identity may be rewritten as difference of urban costs:
wC − wS = CCu − CSu .
In what follows we focus on CBD dropping taking SBD into account due to equilibrium equivalency
of consumption in centrum and suburbia.
2.3 Equilibrium wages and the city structure
Regarding the labor markets, the equilibrium wages of workers are determined by the zero-profit
condition. In other words, operating profits are completely absorbed by the wage bill. Hence, the
equilibrium wage rates in the CBD and in the SBDs must satisfy the conditions ΠC(wC∗) = 0 and
ΠS(wS∗) = 0, respectively. Thus, setting (5) (respectively (6)) equal to zero, solving for wC∗ (respec-
tively wS∗), we get:
wC∗ =
I
ϕ
, wS∗ =
I−K(xS)
ϕ
(13)
Hence
wC∗ − wS∗ = K + k||x
S ||
ϕ
,
which means that the equilibrium wage wedge is proportional to the level of the communication cost
that prevails at the SBD. Substituting of (11) and (7) into previous formula yields:
(ϕt− k)
√
mθl = K
√
mpi + (ϕt+ k)
√
(1− θ)l > 0 (14)
which implies that inequality ϕt − k > 0 is necessary condition for equilibrium existence. More
exactly, the opposite inequality k ≥ ϕt means that distance-sensitive communication costs are too
large in comparison to commuting ones, so in fact we have rather communicatively separated cities,
2For technical reasons it is convenient to treat q¯0 as some kind of rent compensation, subtracting it from costs rather
adding to wage.
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than connected CBD and SBD.
Assuming from now on that ϕt − k > 0 holds, we have to solve this equation with respect to θ.
Admissible solution θ∗ of equation (14) will be referred as equilibrium share. First we consider more
simple limit case K = 0, i.e. fixed communication costs supposed to be negligible. Then the solution
is
θ∗ =
(ϕt+ k)2
(ϕt+ k)2 + (ϕt− k)2m =
1
1 +mδ2
where δ stands for
ϕt− k
ϕt+ k
∈ (0, 1). Note that θ∗ > 1
1 +m
, because δ2 < 1.
Remark. Value of δ measures the relative difference of commuting costs and distance-sensitive commu-
nication costs. The larger is this difference, the more firms tend to transfer their activity to suburbia,
thus the lesser is central share of firms θ∗. Obviously δ increases with respect to commuting costs t.
Note that ϕt ≤ k immediately implies that polycentric structure is cost-inefficient, because com-
munication costs are too large, thus we will assume from now on ϕt > k. Then we can define the
following city characteristics
lM =
piK2
(ϕt− k)2 =
piK2
4k2
· (1− δ)
2
δ2
.
Proposition 1. i) Let l ≤ lM then the unique solution of equation (14) is θ∗ = 1 with m = 0, i.e.
city is, in fact, monocentric.
ii) Let l ≤ lM then for each m ≥ 1 equation (14) has unique solution
θ∗ ∈
(
1
1 +mδ2
, 1
)
, i.e. there exists an equilibrium distribution of firms.
iii) The CBD share of firms θ∗(l,m) decreases with respect to both population l and number of
SBDs m and
lim
l→∞
θ∗(l,m) =
1
1 +mδ2
, lim
m→∞ θ
∗(l,m) =
lM
l
∈ (0, 1). (15)
Let’s substitute function θ∗(m, l) into the urban cost function
CCu = t
√
θl
pi
− t
3
·
√
l
pi
[
θ3/2 + (1− θ)
√
1− θ
m
]
defined in previous subsection. Then
CCu (l, 0) =
2
3
t
√
l
pi
for all l ≥ 0
and
CCu (l,m) =
2
3
t
√
l
pi
for all m > 0 and for all l ≤ piK
2
4k2
· (1− δ)
2
δ2
.
Moreover, equation (14) implies that√
1− θ∗(l,m)
m
= δ
√
θ∗(l,m)− K
√
pi
(ϕ · t+ k)√l = δ
√
θ∗(l,m)− (1− δ)K
√
pi
2k
√
l
,
thus for m > 0 and l >
piK2
4k2
· (1− δ)
2
δ2
the urban cost function
CCu (l,m) =
t
3
[2 + (1− δ)(1− θ∗(l,m))]
√
θ∗(l,m) · l
pi
+
tK · (1− δ)
6k
(1− θ∗(l,m)).
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Figure 2: Comparative statics of urban costs
Proposition 2. Function CCu (m, l) is continuous for all m ≥ 0, l ≥ 0 and continuously differentiable
function for m > 0, l > 0. Moreover, CCu (l,m) strictly increases with respect to l, strictly decreases
with respect to m for all l >
piK2
4k2
· (1− δ)
2
δ2
and
lim
l→+∞
CCu (l,m) = +∞, limm→+∞C
C
u (l,m) =
2t
3
√
lM
pi
=
(1 + δ)K
3ϕδ
.
Figure 2 represents results of Proposition 3 in visual way as simulation in Wolfram’s Mathematica
8.0.
3 Short-Run Inter-City Equilibrium
Until now we studied equilibrium decentralization within the city, or Intra-City equilibrium. Let’s turn
to Inter-City Equilibrium assuming that city populations lr and numbers of SBD mr are given (in
short run) for each city r. This assumption is quite reasonable in short-run. The long-run equilibrium
with endogenous population and number of SBD will be considered in section 4. Equilibrium shares
of firms located at CBD θ∗r may be obtained as solutions of equation (14) independently for each city
r. These shares in turn allow to determine the equilibrium values of
• central zone radii rCr and distances ||xSr || from CBD to any SBD due to (7);
• land rents in central zone RCr and in suburbia RSr due to (8) and (9);
• initial endowment of nume´raire q¯0r due to (10);
• wage difference wCr − wSr due to (11).
Note that these values depend on population lr, SBD number mr as well as magnitudes of production
costs ϕ, commuting costs t and communication costs K, k and don’t depend on utility U(q0; q(i), i ∈
[0, n]) and trade costs τ .
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Equilibrium shares θ∗r determine cost-efficient distribution of firms, while the workers need positive
disposable income to survive in “city jungle”, e.g., for CBD-employee it means
wCr + q¯0r −RCr (x)− t||x|| > 0.
This additional “consumer’s cut-off condition” completes the notion of City equilibrium. While urban
costs RCr (x) + t||x|| − q¯0r don’t depend on inter-city trade (and even on existence of other cities), the
wage
wCr =
prr(i) ·Qrr(i) +
∑
s 6=r(prs(i)− τ) ·Qrs(i)
ϕ
,
on the contrary, substantially depends on trade, as well as on specific form of utility U(q0; q(i), i ∈
[0, n]).
3.1 Trade, Wages and Utility
Consider now our multi-regional setting. To simplify description, assume that there are two regions,
Home and Foreign. Let λ be the share of workers residing in Home city, exogenous in short-run. Then
populations of both cities are lH = λL and lF = (1− λ)L, correspondingly. We shall use Ottaviano’s
quasi-linear utility function incapsulating quadratic sub-utility
U(q0; q(i), i ∈ [0, n]) = α
nˆ
0
q(i)di− β
2
nˆ
0
[q(i)]2di− γ
2
 nˆ
0
q(i)di
2 + q0
where α > 0, β > γ > 0. Comprehensive analysis of linear city with two SBDs with this function was
carried out in Cavailhe`s et al. (2007).
For Home region we define demand functions of representative consumer: qHH(i) and qFH(j) as
solution of consumer problem
maxU(q0; q(i), i ∈ [0, nH + nF ])
subject to
nHˆ
0
pHH(i)qHH(i)di+
nFˆ
0
pFH(j)qFH(j)dj + q0 = EH .
Similarly demand functions qFF (j) and qHF (i) of representative consumer of Foreign region may be
defined. Facing this demands, firms of first region maximize profit
IH(i) = λL · pHH(i) · qHH(i) + (1− λ)L · [pHF (i)− τ ] · qHF (i)
and obtain optimal (equilibrium) prices and quantities. Zero-profit condition (13) determines equi-
librium wages. It should be mentioned that trade is profitable only if trade costs τ are sufficiently
small.3 Otherwise, we obtain the Autarchy Inter-City Equilibrium with trade bounded by city walls.
In particular, the Home firm’s income is
IH(i) = λL · pHH(i) · qHH(i).
3Sufficient condition for trade with arbitrary inter-city distribution of population is τ < τtrade =
2αβϕ
2βϕ+ γL
(see
Ottaviano et al. (2002)).
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Anyways, specifying of utility function and trade costs allows us to determine wages in both CBD
and SBD, which completes the equilibrium description. Further both possible cases will be considered
separately: City Equilibrium under Autarchy and City Equilibrium with Trade.
3.2 Equilibrium under Autarchy
Assume at first that trade costs τ a very large and inter-city trade is non-profitable. It implies that
firms in each city forced to trade with local consumers only. Thus equilibrium wage of CBD-employee
wC∗ =
I∗r
ϕ
=
lr · p∗rr · q∗rr
ϕ
,
where p∗rr is equilibrium (local) price, q∗rr is equilibrium demand of representative (local) consumer.
These wages are determined independently for each city, so we may drop regional subscript r.
This representative consumer maximizes utility
U(q0; q(i), i ∈ [0, n]) = α
nˆ
0
q(i)di− β
2
nˆ
0
[q(i)]2di− γ
2
 nˆ
0
q(i)di
2 + q0
subject to
nˆ
0
p(i)q(i)di+ q0 = w
C + q¯0−RC(x)−t||x|| = wC − CCu ,
where n = l/ϕ is the local local number of firms. First of all, recall some well-known results concerning
consumer’s problem with this form of utility.
Proposition 3. Consumer’s demand is linear function
q(i) =
α
β + γn
− 1
β
p(i) +
γ
(β + γn)β
· P,
where
P =
nˆ
0
p(i)di
is price index. Equilibrium prices are uniform by goods
p∗(i) ≡ p∗ = αβ
2β + γn
,
while equilibrium demand of representative consumer is
q∗(i) ≡ q∗ = α
2β + γn
.
Consumer’s surplus at equilibrium is equal to
CS =
α2n(β + γn)
2(2β + γn)2
.
See for details (Ottaviano et al., 2002).
Using these facts and taking into account that n =
l
ϕ
we obtain the terms of equilibrium wage at
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CBD
wC∗ =
l · p∗ · q∗
ϕ
=
α2βϕl
(2βϕ+ γl)2
and consumer’s surplus
CS =
α2(βϕ+ γl)l
2(2βϕ+ γl)2
,
which does not depend on consumer residence. Moreover sum of wage and surplus (urban gains, for
short) is
GCu = CS + w
C∗ =
α2(3βϕ+ γl)l
2(2βϕ+ γl)
.
Finally, consumer’s welfare in CBD is a difference of urban gains and urban costs
V C = CS + wC∗ − CCu .
Similar to CBD we may calculate the corresponding SBD’s characteristics: wage
wS∗ =
α2βϕl
(2βϕ+ γl)2
− t
(√
θ∗l
pi
−
√
(1− θ∗)l
mpi
)
,
urban gains
GSu = CS + w
S∗ =
α2(3βϕ+ γl)l
2(2βϕ+ γl)
− t
(√
θ∗l
pi
−
√
(1− θ∗)l
mpi
)
,
and welfare
V S = CS + wS∗ − CSu .
Recall that in city equilibrium an identity
wC − CCu = wS − CSu
holds. Thus equilibrium welfares in central zone and in suburbia are equal V S = V C and feasibility
condition for SBD
wS − CSu ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ wC − CCu ≥ 0.
Once again, we may focus on CBD only. Note that central wage wC∗ as well as consumer’s surplus
CS does not depend on number of SBD’s m, in contract to urban costs CCu .
Proposition 4. Wage function wC∗(l) is strictly concave for 0 ≤ l ≤ 4βϕ
γ
, strictly convex for
l >
4βϕ
γ
, reaches its maximum value
α2
8γ
at l∗ =
2βϕ
γ
and
lim
l→+∞
wC∗(l) = 0, wC∗(0) = 0,
∂wC∗
∂l
(0) =
α2
2
< +∞.
Urban gains GCu (l) is strictly concave and increasing function for all l ≥ 0,
lim
l→+∞
GCu (l) =
α2
2γ
, GCu (0) = 0,
∂GCu
∂l
(0) =
3α2
4
< +∞.
Proof of this proposition is a routine analytic study of functions wC∗(l) and GCu (l). Figure 3
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Figure 3: Wage wC and urban gains wC + CS
represents results of Proposition 4 in visual way as simulation in Wolfram’s Mathematica 8.0.
Existence and Comparative Statics
Let’s combine results of Propositions 2 and 4. It was mentioned above that equilibrium share θ∗
generates city equilibrium only in case of wC(l) − CCu (l,m)) ≥ 0. Note that wage wC(l) is bounded
function while urban costs increase unrestrictedly with respect to l, hence wC(l)− CCu (l,m)) < 0 for
all sufficiently large l. Moreover, wC(0) = CCu (0,m) = 0, while
∂wC∗
∂L
(0) =
α2
2
<
∂CCu
∂L
(0,m) = +∞,
thus wC(l)− CCu (l,m) < 0 for all sufficiently small l. If commuting costs t are too large it is possible
that city equilibrium does not exist for all l. The simple sufficient condition for equilibrium existence
is that maximum wage exceeds the urban costs in monocentric city:
wC(l∗) > CCu (l
∗, 0) ⇐⇒ t < 3
√
piα2
16
√
2βγϕ
.
In this case for all m ≥ 0 and l from neighbourhood of l∗ = 2βϕ
γ
inequality wC(l) ≥ CCu (l, 0) ≥
CCu (l,m) holds. Another sufficient condition is
α2βϕlM
(2βϕ+ γlM )2
= wC(lM ) > CCu (l
M ,m) ≡ (1 + δ)K
3ϕδ
, (16)
where lM =
piK2
4k2
· (1− δ)
2
δ2
(see Proposition 2).
Let inequality wC(l)−CCu (l,m)) > 0 holds for some l and m, then we can define two critical values
of city population – maximum and minimum “equilibrium” population:
lmin(m) > 0 : w
C(lmin(m)) = C
C
u (lmin(m),m) and ∀l < lmin(m) : wC(l) < CCu (l,m) holds,
lmax(m) < +∞ : wC(lmax(m)) = CCu (lmax(m),m) and ∀l > lmax(m): wC(l) < CCu (l,m) holds
It is obvious that increasing of m broaden interval [lmin(m), lmax(m)] (more exactly, lmin(m) decreases,
while lmax(m) increases with respect to m).
4 Moreover, disposable income wC(l) − CCu (l,m)) and
welfare V C = GCu (l) − CCu (l,m)) both increases with respect to m, with exception l ∈
[
0, lM
]
when
4If wC(lM ) > (1+δ)K
3ϕδ
then 0 < lmin(m) ≡ lmin(0) < lM < lmax(0) < lmax(m) for all m ≥ 0.
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Figure 4: Comparative statics of equilibria
urban costs CCu (l,m) do not depend on m. Figure 5 illustrates equilibrium under autarchy and
comparative statics with respect to m using simulation in Wolfram’s Mathematica 8.0.
Discussion. Previous considerations show that autarchy may be very restrictive to the city sizes:
city survives only if its size exceeds the lower threshold lmin > 0 and does not exceed the upper one
lmax. Developing of the city infrastructure (i.e. increasing in m) shifts up the upper bound lmax, but
cannot help too much with lower one lmin.
3.3 Equilibrium with Trade
Assume that trade costs τ < τtrade =
2αβϕ
2βϕ+ γL
where L = lH + lF is total number of workers. Then
trade is profitable for any worker’s distribution among cities (see Ottaviano et al. (2002)). Recall that
lH = λL, lF = (1− λ)L for λ ∈ [0, 1]. Case λ = 1 (resp. λ = 0) implies that Foreign city (resp. Home
city) disappears and all population gathered in Home city (resp. Foreign city). To make it possible,
assume L < min {lmax(mH), lmax(mF )}, in particular, wC∗H (1) > CCu (1). Otherwise, some values of
λ ∈ [0, 1] may be non-feasible.
Proposition 5. Trade equilibrium prices are uniform by goods
p∗HH(i) ≡ p∗HH =
2αβϕ+ τγL · (1− λ)
2(2βϕ+ γL)
, p∗FF (i) ≡ p∗FF =
2αβϕ+ τγL · λ
2(2βϕ+ γL)
,
p∗HF = p
∗
FF +
τ
2
, p∗FH = p
∗
HH +
τ
2
.
Home Consumer’s Surplus
CSH(λ) =
α2L
2(βϕ+ γL)
− αL
βϕ+ γL
· [p∗HH · λ+ p∗FH · (1− λ)] +
+
L
2βϕ
·
[
(p∗HH)
2 · λ+ (p∗FH)2 · (1− λ)
]
− γL
2
2βϕ · (βϕ+ γL) · [p
∗
HH · λ+ p∗FH · (1− λ)]2 (17)
is increasing and concave function of λ.
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Figure 5: Autarchy and Trade
Home Equilibrium wage
wC∗H (λ) =
βϕL
(2βϕ+ γL)2
[(
α+
τγL
2βϕ
(1− λ)
)2
· λ+
(
(α− τ)− τγL
2βϕ
(1− λ)
)2
· (1− λ)
]
(18)
is strictly concave function, increasing at λ = 0.
For analytical proof see Ottaviano et al. (2002) and Cavailhe`s et al. (2007)
Note that
wC∗H (0) =
α2βϕL
(2βϕ+ γL)2
(
1− τ · 2αβϕ+ γL
2αβϕ
)2
> 0 = CCu (0)
for all τ < τtrade =
2αβϕ
2βϕ+ γL
. Moreover, for letting τ = 0 in (18) we obtain
wC∗H (λ) =
α2βϕL
(2βϕ+ γL)2
= wC∗H (1) > C
C
u (1) ≥ CCu (λ)
for all λ ∈ [0, 1], because lmin < L < lmax. Thus, for all sufficiently small τ inequality wC∗H (λ) > CCu (λ)
holds for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. It means that sufficient trade freeness cancels Problem of lower threshold, i.e.
small cities could survive, trading with the larger ones.
Typical example of simulation is presented at Figure 5.
Summarizing the previous considerations we formulate the following
Proposition 6. (i) Under autarky there exist threshold values 0 < lmin < lmax < ∞, such that
consumer’s cut-off condition holds (hence, city equilibrium exists) if and only if city population lr ∈
(lmin, lmax).
(ii) Increasing in SBD number mr broaden admissibility interval (lmin, lmax) for specific city, i.e.,
lmin(m + 1) ≤ lmin(m) and lmax(m + 1) ≥ lmax(m). Yet if lmin(m) ≤ lM then increasing in SBD
number does not affect lmin, i.e., lmin(m
′) ≡ lmin(m) for all m′ ≥ m.
(iii) On the other hand, if trade costs τ are sufficiently small, then lmin(m) ≡ 0 for all m.
This Proposition implies that too small (l < lmin) or too large (l > lmax) cities cannot survive
under autarky. Developing of city infrastructure may help to shift up the upper bound lmax, the
lower threshold, however, cannot shift lmin closer to zero when lmin belongs to “monocentric interval”
(0, lM ). Only trade with the larger neighbouring cities helps to survive for the small ones.
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3.4 Endogenous SBD number
In what follows we assume that l > lM , which forces firms to move from center to suburbs. Previous
considerations show that then appear some number m ≥ 1 of SBDs. What determines its number?
There is no simple and unambiguous answer, because in practice it depends on many factors, that are
not always economic ones.
One of the main questions is “Who can afford the building of additional suburb?” If answer is
“None”, we find ourself in setting with predefined number of SBDs (like model of Cavailhe`s et al.,
2007). Otherwise, we assume that decision is up to ‘City Developer’, who takes into account the social
welfare considerations. This welfare is measures by indirect utility
V (λ) = CS(λ) + wC∗(λ)− CCu (λ).
Assume that the current number of SBD is m ≥ 0 and ‘City Developer’ considers prospective develop-
ing of city infrastructure. It implies an increasing of SBD number to m+ 1, which requires additional
development costs D > 0 measured by nume´raire good. On the other hand, this development increases
(ceteris paribus) total welfare by magnitude
∆m = l · (V (l,m+ 1)− V (l,m)) = l ·
(
(GCu (l)− CCu (l,m+ 1))− (GCu (l)− CCu (l,m))
)
=
= l · (CCu (l,m)− CCu (l,m+ 1))
Urban costs CCu (l,m) decrease with respect to m, hence ∆m > 0. On the other hand,
∞∑
m=0
∆m = l · (CCu (l, 0)− limm→∞C
C
u (l,m)) =
2t · l
3 · √pi ·
(√
l −
√
lM
)
where lM =
piK2
4k2
· (1− δ)
2
δ2
=
piK2
(ϕt− k)2 . Thus ∆m → 0 very quickly and ∆m < D for all sufficiently
large m. Moreover,
∞∑
m=0
∆m =
2t · l
3 · √pi ·
(√
l − piK
ϕt− k
)
is obviously increasing in both city population l and commuting costs t. The same holds for each ∆m
taken separately, but the proof is cumbersome an requires Implicit Function differentiation.
Consideration of efficiency determine the cost-efficient endogenous number of SBD’s:
m∗ = max {m | ∆m ≥ D} .
In particular, the previous considerations imply that m∗ also increases in both l and t. Note that
theoretical comparative statics is fully supported by empirical evidences (see MacMillen and Smith,
2003).
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